- Israel launched a ground incursion that risks repeating its past mistakes in Lebanon.
- Israel’s 15-year occupation across Lebanon’s border ended as a quagmire akin to the US’s Vietnam.
- Israel recently achieved stunning victories against Hezbollah but its new operation is risky.
As Israel begins what it describes as a limited ground operation to destroy Hezbollah’s presence and artillery in southern Lebanon, critics are warning that Israel risks repeating the disasters that dogged its previous campaigns in Lebanon.
The question turns on the extent to which Israel has learned lessons from past mistakes, and how well it can apply those lessons against Hezbollah, a skilled and well-armed paramilitary enjoying the advantage of fighting on its home ground. Much as before, Israel risks being drawn into a bloody quagmire it cannot win.
The ghosts of history always stalk the Middle East, no less in the picturesque hills and valleys along the Israel-Lebanon border. From 1985 to 2000, Israel occupied a 15-mile-wide “security zone” in southern Lebanon, ostensibly run by a Lebanese Christian faction backed by IDF troops. The zone began as a buffer to keep Palestinian groups in Lebanon from attacking border communities in northern Israel. It ended as a quagmire that led to the rise of Hezbollah, a constant trickle of killed and wounded soldiers in casualty-sensitive Israel, and the frustration of a long, grinding guerrilla war of ambushes and roadside bombs. For Israelis, Lebanon became what Vietnam and Afghanistan were to the US and Soviet Union.
Israel evacuated — or retreated under fire — from the security zone in 2000. Israel returned in 2006, when 30,000 Israeli troops crossed the border in retaliation for a Hezbollah ambush of IDF troops in northern Israel. The 34-day 2006 Israel-Lebanon War was arguably the nadir of Israeli military performance (at least until Hamas’s surprise attack from Gaza on October 7, 2023). Israel’s overconfidence that airpower alone could defeat Hamas, followed by a clumsy and ill-prepared ground campaign, ended in a draw that enabled Hezbollah to claim victory just by surviving.
This history may have lulled Hezbollah — as well as the rest of the world — into believing that Israel would never dare invade Lebanon, and would suffer a bloody nose if it did. Yet not for the first time, Israel has confounded its critics and pulled off a stunning surprise. Remarkably precise intelligence, exquisitely planned covert operations such as exploding pagers, and well-timed airstrikes have wiped out Hezbollah’s top- and mid-level leaders, as well as some of the group’s estimated 150,000 rockets.
However, these operations play into Israel’s strengths in high tech versus Hezbollah, whose mastery of technology seems closer to the 1980s. Boots on the ground are a different matter. Hezbollah savors the chance to engage in a ground war of ambushes and IEDs that nullify Israeli tech. Israel officials would likely prefer to avoid a ground campaign. But 80,000 Israelis have had to evacuate northern Israel for the past year, in part because Hezbollah fighters on the border can fire anti-tank missiles directly into Israeli houses. Under pressure to do something, the government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorized a ground invasion to clear Hezbollah from the border and reassure Israelis that they can return home.
In some ways, Israeli troops will face a familiar battlefield. Hilly terrain that is less than ideal for movement by armored vehicles, and dotted with villages whose mostly Shia inhabitants are inclined to support Hezbollah (and in some cases are part-time Hezbollah fighters). Hezbollah has had decades to fortify the area, especially with an elaborate network of tunnels similar to what Hamas has used to great effect in Gaza. Well-trained Hezbollah fighters, equipped with Russian- and Iranian-made anti-tank missiles, can pop up from hidden tunnel entrances and fire a missile, forcing the IDF into a whack-a-mole war. While the decimation of Hezbollah’s leadership will hamper its effectiveness in the near future, its members are trained to operate independently.
On the other hand, Israel appears to have learned some lessons from its past failures. Instead of tanks charging across into the border into Hezbollah ambushes, the IDF has sent commando teams to reconnoiter the terrain and destroy weapons and fortifications to prep the ground before the tanks and infantry go in. This approach still has its dangers. On Wednesday, eight IDF soldiers were killed in southern Lebanon, a toll that includes six troops with the elite Egoz Commando Unit.
One intriguing question is the depth of Israeli intelligence on Hezbollah’s forces and infrastructure in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah took elaborate precautions to keep his whereabouts secret, yet after two decades of painstaking intelligence collection, Israel managed to pinpoint Nasrallah’s location and assassinate him with an airstrike. Such deep penetration into Hezbollah’s innermost secrets suggests that Israel may also have amassed solid information on Hezbollah’s presence on the border.
Yet these are tactical considerations. The dilemma for Israel is strategic. If it carries out a short ground campaign to cripple Hezbollah’s presence on Israel’s border, then the moment the IDF leaves is when Hezbollah will return to fire at Israeli towns — a dilemma it has also seen in Gaza where Hamas militants have returned to areas cleared by Israeli soldiers. If Israel creates another security zone, then instead of Israeli civilians, it will be Israeli soldiers being picked off. And hovering over those hills are the specters from 40 years ago, when what was meant to be a short campaign dragged into a 15-year occupation that killed over 250 soldiers and fractured Israeli society.
It is quite possible that a ceasefire will emerge, most likely resulting in an uneasy calm interrupted by bouts of violence. It is also possible that a short war may become a long nightmare. Faced with an implacable adversary, Israel may ultimately feel that it has no choice.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.
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